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Conscience clauses and equality law  
Brice Dickson, Professor of International and Comparative Law, Queen’s University Belfast1 
examines interesting recent developments in both the Supreme Court (SC) and at the 
Northern Ireland Assembly concerning the compatibility of conscience clauses with equality 
laws. The extent to which equality obligations should make allowance for deeply held 
personal convictions is a concern for some religious believers and presents a challenge to 
UK anti-discrimination practitioners. Professor Dickson argues that the allowance made 
should be negligible, not because some convictions are not worth accommodating but 
because they can be accommodated in other ways which do not impinge upon other 
people’s rights to be treated as equals.   
The abortion case  
In Greater Glasgow Health Board v Dougan [2014] UKSC 68, [2015] 2 WLR 126 the 
SC rejected claims by two Catholic coordinators in the labour ward at the Southern 
General Hospital in Glasgow that under the Abortion Act 1967 (the 1967 Act) they 
were entitled to refuse to engage in activities such as booking in patients to have an 
abortion, allocating staff to care for those patients, or supervising and supporting 
midwives who are assisting in the abortion. As is well known, the 1967 Act 
recognised a right of conscientious objection to taking part in an abortion, but the 
question for the SC was how far that right extends.  
Everything turned on the interpretation of s4(1), which reads:  
No person shall be under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or 
other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act 
to which he has a conscientious objection.  
The key words are ‘participate’ and ‘treatment’. The 5-judge SC, led on this occasion 
by Lady Hale Deputy President of the SC, unanimously held that, while ‘treatment’ 
should be interpreted broadly, participate’ should be interpreted narrowly. This meant 
that the two coordinators could not be said to be ‘participating’ in treatment if they 
were merely engaged in various ancillary, administrative or managerial tasks 
associated with the treatment. In this context, said Lady Hale, ‘participate’ means 
taking part in a ‘hands-on’ capacity, that is, actually performing the tasks involved in 
the course of treatment (para 38). She also thought that this construction of s4(1) 
was more likely to be in line with parliament’s intention when passing the 1967 Act.     
The SC was nevertheless at pains to point out that its decision on the interpretation 
of the conscience clause in the 1967 Act did not mean that the two women claimants 
could not claim that their employer should have made more reasonable adjustments 
to the requirements of their job in order to make allowances for their religious beliefs. 
That issue, said the SC, was best resolved by an employment tribunal (para 24).  
Services v employment 
The distinction between the provision of services and the provision of employment is 
an important one. People who access services – such as those provided by a 
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hospital or by a hotel – expect to be treated as equals because in the vast majority of 
situations there are no objectively justifiable grounds for denying them access to 
those services on the same basis as everyone else. But people who are employees 
– even when they are engaged in the business of providing services to others – may 
more frequently be able to claim on objectively justifiable grounds that they should 
not be required to do certain things which their employer wishes them to do. Service 
provision is an impersonal relationship whereas employment is a personal one. An 
employee therefore has a better case for requiring an employer to make allowances 
in his or her favour on account of his or her personal circumstances.     
In her Oxfordshire High Sheriff’s Lecture delivered on October 14, 2014, entitled ‘Are 
we a Christian country? Religious freedom and the law’, Lady Hale stressed the 
importance of the distinction just made: 
It is one thing to expect employers (and others) to make reasonable 
adjustments to cater for their employees’ religious beliefs. It is another thing to 
expect the law to make exceptions to generally applicable rules in order to 
cater for particular religious beliefs. Believers who want it to do this must 
surely show that it will not cause harm to others, whether members of the 
religion or outsiders. 
S4(1) of the 1967 Act is a good example of the law making an exception to a 
generally applicable rule in order to cater for particular beliefs, but we should 
remember that under s4(2) the exception does not apply if participating in the 
abortion treatment is ‘necessary to save the life or prevent grave permanent injury to 
the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman’. In such scenarios the harm that 
would be caused by allowing the exception would outweigh the benefits to be 
obtained from granting it. The test referred to in the second sentence of the quote 
from Lady Hale would not then be satisfied.    
Northern Ireland 
This point is worth remembering in Northern Ireland, where the 1967 Act does not 
apply at all. At present, the only situations in which an abortion is legal in Northern 
Ireland are ones in which, because of s4(2), no right of conscientious objection 
currently exists even in England, Scotland or Wales.  
The law relating to abortion is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland (unlike in 
Scotland or Wales), but there is minimal prospect of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
legislating to extend the 1967 Act to Northern Ireland because the vast majority of 
both unionist and nationalist Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) are 
opposed to the so-called ‘right to choose’.  Most unionists, by the way, are also 
opposed to homosexuality, which means that gay marriage is not yet allowed in 
Northern Ireland, nor can gay men ever donate blood. 
Controversy over the extent to which people of religious faith should be allowed to 
deny services to gay people in Northern Ireland has recently arisen as a result of a 
move by the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (ECNI) to take a bakery to 
court for refusing to decorate a cake it was baking with the words ‘Support gay 
marriage’. The facts may be trivial, but the case raises important questions 
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concerning the extent to which people of religious faith should be allowed to treat 
people unequally.  
Although the bakery case will not be heard in the county court for a month or two, 
regardless of its outcome a Democratic Unionist Party politician, Paul Givan MLA, is 
planning to table a Private Members’ Bill at the Northern Ireland Assembly which 
would have the effect of extending to a person running a commercial business the 
right to restrict the provision of goods, facilities and services, or the use or disposal 
of premises, ‘so as to avoid endorsing, promoting or facilitating behaviour or beliefs 
which conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of that person’. 
The Private Members’ Bill 
The Bill is a thinly veiled attempt to allow people of religious faith to discriminate in 
the way they provide services to gay people. Most readers will remember the case of 
Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73, [2013] 1 WLR 3741 [see Briefing 697], where the SC 
held (again led by Lady Hale) that the owners of a private hotel had discriminated 
against a gay couple because they only allowed couples who were married to book a 
double room in the hotel. All five Justices agreed that the hotel owners’ right to 
manifest their religious belief was justifiably limited within the terms of article 9(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Mr Givan’s ‘Northern Ireland 
Freedom of Conscience Amendment Bill’ would reverse that decision as far as hotels 
and other service providers in Northern Ireland are concerned. Judging by his 
comments on a BBC programme broadcast on February 5, 2015, Mr Givan also 
thinks his Bill would allow hotels to refuse double rooms to unmarried heterosexual 
couples.  
There are at least four serious objections to what his Bill proposes. First and 
foremost, it would alter the existing delicate balance which has been carefully 
constructed within UK discrimination law. The Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations (NI) 2006 are almost identical to the equivalent 2007 Regulations 
applying in England, Scotland and Wales. Regulation 7 (reg 6 in the 2007 Regs) 
creates exceptions for things done within a private home or when leased premises 
are being disposed of, and regulation 16 (reg 14 in the 2007 Regs) creates a further 
exception for organisations the sole or main purpose of which is to practise, advance 
or teach a religion or belief and which want to restrict the provision of goods, facilities 
or services in the course of their activities or to restrict the use or disposal of 
premises they own or control.  
The exception for religious or belief organisations is limited to situations where the 
provider of the service is itself a religious or belief organisation. Indeed the regulation 
explicitly states that the exception does not apply to organisations of which the sole 
or main purpose is commercial (reg 16(2)(a)). Mr Givan’s Bill would extend the 
existing exception to all commercial organisations. That is a radical departure from 
the 2006 settlement and swings the pendulum hugely in favour of individuals, as 
opposed to organisations, who wish to have their religious beliefs trump the rights of 
people not to be discriminated against. 
Other objections 
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Secondly, the Bill, as currently worded, would protect convictions based on religious 
grounds only. This privileges religious beliefs over other beliefs, again contrary to the 
2006 and 2007 Regulations. An individual who wishes to restrict access to goods, 
facilities and services to gay people purely on grounds of conscience, not based on 
religion, would not be able to claim the ‘protection’ provided by the Bill. This is 
doubtless because it would open the door to the application of all kinds of prejudice 
supposedly based on moral grounds. But why should faith-based prejudice be any 
more acceptable than prejudice based on other grounds? Is the former any more 
objectively justifiable than the latter, or is it just more traditional?         
Thirdly, the Bill would allow people with strongly held religious convictions to refuse 
to provide goods, facilities, services or premises if this would avoid them ‘endorsing, 
promoting or facilitating’ behaviour or beliefs which conflict with their convictions. The 
phrase ‘endorsing, promoting or facilitating’ is nowhere defined or illustrated. It might, 
for example, mean that a person working in a bank or building society could refuse to 
arrange a mortgage for a gay couple. Likewise, a person working in an estate 
agency or a travel agency could refuse to assist a gay person who wants to buy a 
house, rent a flat or book a holiday. To permit such ‘exceptions’ would be to allow 
private prejudice and disapproval to manifest themselves in public ways, thereby 
intruding into the personal lives of individuals who are otherwise causing no harm to 
others in society. The logic of the approach is that providers of services could 
discriminate against people who, for example, drink or smoke, eat too much, gamble 
or have had an abortion.    
Fourthly, the alleged reform is internally contradictory. It purports to protect people’s 
strongly held religious convictions but refuses to protect other people’s strongly held 
non-religious convictions. In an increasingly secularised society it seeks to prioritise 
one group of beliefs over another. If this prioritisation was based on the harm which 
contrary non-religious behaviours and beliefs were likely to bring about (such as the 
practice of female genital mutilation or the cruel treatment of animals) there might be 
a justification for it. But neither Mr Givan nor others who support the Bill have yet 
explained what harm is caused (except to their own beliefs) by allowing gay people 
to get on with their private lives in ways which do not impact in the slightest on the 
rest of society.              
The role of conscience clauses 
Mr Givan prefaces the consultation paper accompanying his Private Members’ Bill by 
referring to laws which, throughout the UK, allow Sikhs not to wear crash helmets 
when driving motorbikes or safety helmets when working on construction sites. 
These are indeed interesting exceptions to health and safety laws, but they are 
based on the principle that while, as a general rule, people need to be protected 
against their own folly in certain situations, they should be permitted to risk their own 
lives if their religious conviction requires this. A further example would be the 
unwillingness of Jehovah’s Witnesses to accept a blood transfusion. Such individuals 
are endangering or disrespecting no-one but themselves by adopting such a stance. 
There is also a noble legal tradition whereby people who conscientiously object to 
serving in military forces should be allowed to do so. Even at a time when serving 
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soldiers who deserted during World War I were being executed for failing in their 
promise to serve, the Military Service Act 1916 allowed individuals not to serve in the 
first place if they could satisfy a Military Service Tribunal that they had a 
conscientious objection to doing so. In many instances, however, they were required 
to undertake some form of alternative service. A similar scheme was created under 
the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939, where many were exempted from 
service in the armed forces if they could demonstrate that they were opposed to 
using warfare as a means of settling international disputes. The right to 
conscientious objection is based not so much on religious belief as on a moral 
abhorrence at the use of potentially lethal force, even in the defence of one’s 
country. 
The view of the European Court of Human Rights  
The first sentence of article 9(1) of the ECHR states that ‘everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ and it continues by saying that this right 
includes the freedom ‘to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance’. Article 9(2) allows this latter freedom to be limited if the 
limitations ‘are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
No case has ever been successfully brought against the UK for failing to protect a 
person’s belief that homosexuality was in some way wrong. In Eweida v UK (2013) 
[see Briefing 663] one of the four applicants (Ms Ladele) was a registrar of marriages 
in Islington who refused to register civil partnerships and was disciplined for adopting 
that stance. When she complained that she was being discriminated against on the 
basis of her Christian beliefs she succeeded at the ET but her employers won at 
both the EAT and the CA. Ms Ladele was refused leave to appeal to the SC but she 
lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). She was 
joined in Strasbourg by Mr McFarlane, a counsellor for Relate who had been 
dismissed for refusing to give sex-counselling to gay couples and who had lost his 
claim for discrimination and unfair dismissal at both domestic tribunal levels.  
The ECtHR found against both of these applicants. In the case of Ms Ladele it held 
that the UK’s law was within the wide margin of appreciation allowed to national 
authorities when it comes to striking a balance between competing ECHR rights (the 
right on one side to manifest a religious belief and the right on the other side not to 
be discriminated against because of one’s sexuality): Islington Borough Council was 
entitled to require its registrars to register civil partnerships and to cease to employ 
someone who refused to do so. Likewise, in the case of Mr McFarlane the ECtHR 
held that UK law did not violate article 9(1) by allowing Relate, a private company, to 
dismiss an employee who would not implement its policy of providing a service 
without discrimination. It is clear, therefore, that the ECtHR gives greater priority to 
the right not to be discriminated against than it does to the right to manifest religious 
belief.  
As regards the right of conscientious objection to military service, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR has required states to recognise such a right (Bayatyan v 
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Armenia, 2011). In coming to that conclusion the Court turned away from the position 
previously adopted by the European Commission of Human Rights (last set out in 
1995) and held that imposing a criminal sanction on a conscientious objector was a 
violation of article 9(1). It cited findings reached by the UN’s Human Rights 
Committee in 2006 in two complaints made against South Korea (Yeo-Bum Yoon v 
Korea and Myung-Jin Choi v Korea) and also article 10 of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights, in force for all EU countries since 2009, which explicitly 
recognises the right to conscientious objection albeit ‘in accordance with the national 
laws governing exercise of this right’. The ECtHR considered that: 
Opposition to military service, where it is motivated by a serious and 
insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a 
person’s conscience or his deeply and genuinely held religious or other 
beliefs, constitutes a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion and importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9.       
It is safe to assume that if the Private Members’ Bill coming before the Northern 
Ireland Assembly were to be considered by the ECtHR it would not be deemed 
acceptable. The Court would be likely to conclude either that the proposed law falls 
outside the state’s margin of appreciation or that the conviction or belief in question 
(that the behaviour or beliefs of homosexuals should not be endorsed, promoted or 
facilitated) does not have the requisite cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance to attract the protection of article 9. 
Freedom of expression 
There is, however, another relevant principle which may at times come to the aid of 
those whose conscience does not allow them to endorse, promote or facilitate 
homosexuality. It is the principle that no-one should be required to manifest his or 
her religious beliefs by declaring what they are. Thus, in Alexandridis v Greece 
(2008) the ECtHR found a violation of article 9(1) when the applicant, in order to 
begin practising as a lawyer in Greece, was required to reveal that he was not an 
Orthodox Christian. 
To return to the case coming before the Northern Ireland county court concerning the 
words to be iced on a cake, it would surely be common ground between all parties 
that on occasions a supplier of a cake should be entitled to refuse to write words on 
a cake which might give the impression that the supplier of the cake shares the 
views expressed on the cake. It would obviously be unlawful, for example, for 
anyone to write words on a cake which are threatening or abusive and likely to stir 
up racial hatred – so much is clear from s18 of the Public Order Act 1986 and from 
the wider provision in article 9 of the Public Order (NI) Order 1987 (which is not 
limited to racial hatred and extends to arousing fear as well).       
But there may also be situations where the supplier of a cake should be able to 
refuse to write words on a cake which, while not illegal, are, objectively speaking, 
very distasteful. ‘The IRA were right’, ‘Hands off paedophiles’ and ‘Hitler had the 
answer’ are all messages which no-one should be required to write on pain of any 
sanction whatsoever. Admittedly people eating a cake will not necessarily assume 
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that the suppliers of the cake agreed with the sentiments expressed on it, but they 
would surely have assumed that any supplier at least had a choice under the law not 
to express the sentiments without suffering any loss other than the withdrawal of the 
custom of the particular person requesting the cake. 
The bakery in the Northern Ireland case might therefore make the argument that it 
should not be required to express words, even if they are just icing on a cake, in a 
way which contravenes its right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the 
ECHR. Whether ‘Support gay marriage’ is a statement which the supplier of a cake 
has the right not to have to make will depend on whether, in and of itself, the item 
supplied would give the impression that the bakery actually shares the view 
expressed and also on whether the view expressed is so outrageous that no service 
provider should be required even to give an impression that it endorsed the view. I 
do not myself think that those two tests are met in this case and so the ECNI should 
still be successful in its complaint that the bakery has discriminated against a 
customer on grounds of sexual orientation regardless of the article 10 implications. 
Discrimination on grounds of political opinion 
An additional argument raised by the ECNI is that the bakery discriminated against 
its customer on grounds of political opinion, the assumption being that ‘Support gay 
marriage’ is a statement of political opinion, which, given the recent controversies 
throughout the UK on the subject of legalising same-sex marriage, it probably is. In 
England, Scotland and Wales the law protects people against discrimination on the 
basis of religion or belief, with belief being defined as ‘any religious or philosophical 
belief’ (Equality Act 2010, s10(2)). But in Northern Ireland the law also extends 
protection to persons on the basis of political opinion (Fair Employment and 
Treatment (NI) Order 1998, art 3). The term ‘political opinion’ is not defined, except 
to the extent that it excludes an opinion which ‘consists of or includes approval or 
acceptance of the use of violence for political ends connected with the affairs of 
Northern Ireland’ (art 2(4)). 
In the context of political opinion it does not seem plausible to allow the right of 
conscientious objection to be raised as a defence to a claim based on discrimination. 
No-one, surely, has the right to conscientiously object to someone else’s political 
opinion? The only argument the bakery might perhaps raise in this context is a 
corollary to the one based on the right to freedom of expression, namely that the 
bakery should not be forced to express a political opinion if it can be reasonably 
assumed that the bakery is thereby endorsing that opinion. For the reasons given 
above in relation to freedom of expression, I do not think that any objective observer 
would deduce from the words iced on a cake that the bakery which produced the 
icing was endorsing the opinion expressed in those words or that it was being forced 
to suppress its own political opinion. The observer would deduce that the bakery was 
a commercial concern that was merely satisfying its customer’s wishes.  
Conclusion 
Reconciling ‘conscience’ with the right to equality is difficult because, in the context 
of the commercial activities in particular, it is rather challenging to conceptualise 
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equality in a way which allows for someone to ‘conscientiously’ object to the concept. 
Equality is itself a matter of conscience and to imagine that it could be a matter of 
conscience to believe that some people should be treated differently merely on the 
basis of what they do when they are in bed with another person seems as irrational 
as to imagine that the state should deny those people the right to privacy, to liberty, 
or to a fair trial. Where does conscience stop? I would argue that it stops at the door 
marked ‘unlawful discrimination against other people’. 
 
